Article by John Derbyshire |
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| America
Grovels So
the United States has done a full kowtow, begging China’s pardon for
having the audacity to land a plane, crippled by the antics of a
hot-dogging Chinese pilot, on a Chinese airfield, without first securing
the written approval of 43 bureaucrats in Beijing.
The President has also, by implication, blamed U.S. military
personnel for that pilot’s death. In
the words of the wire release I have just been reading: ''Please
convey to the Chinese people and to the family of pilot Wang Wei that we
are very sorry for their loss,'' said the letter, which was released by
the White House. China has accused the U.S. pilot of illegally entering
Chinese territory by making the emergency landing without obtaining
permission in advance, and the letter goes on to say Washington is ''very
sorry the entering of China's airspace and the landing did not have verbal
clearance.'' This
is folly. It is, in fact,
very little short of madness. The
greatest danger to the peace of the world at the present time is the
rabid, psychopathological nationalism of the Chinese, which is being
carefully tended and nurtured by the Communist dictatorship for its own
purposes. That monster has
just been fed a big, nourishing meal by the U.S. administration. Where
is the sense in this? To
begin with, we actually do not know what happened over the South China Sea
the other day, and have no way to investigate the matter since all the
material evidence is in Chinese hands.
On circumstantial evidence, the high probability is the one I
stated above: that it was the
Chinese pilot’s fault. If
this turns out to be right, how is an apology appropriate?
How, even, is an expression of “regret” appropriate?
If you try to run me off the road, and the end of it is that you
trash my car but kill yourself, will I feel “regret” for your death? Not bloody likely. So
what do we do if, once an investigation has been done, it turns out that
this is, indeed, what happened? Withdraw
our apology? You
see here the great difficulty people raised in the Anglo-Saxon democratic
tradition have in dealing with Leninists.
To a Leninist, every fight, even over the most trivial matter of
words and phrases, is a fight to the death.
Nothing can be surrendered, nothing can be compromised.
Meeting the other guy half-way is not part of this mindset.
If forced to make a tactical retreat, the Leninist will do so; but
the setback will rankle, and will be taken as an occasion for fierce
revenge in the future. The
people we are dealing with in Beijing do not play by Harvard Business
School rules. China’s
current leaders are men in their seventies, born in the 1920s.
They got their political education under early Maoism, when
today’s friend was tomorrow’s enemy and the game was played with live
ammo. As Bill Gertz has said:
“These are not nice people.
They do not wish us well.” They
are tigers, who live only to kill and eat. China
is an un-democratic, in fact anti-democratic, country with a state
ideology centered on racial superiority, rabid nationalism, historical
grievance (real and imagined) and the restoration of ancient glories
(ditto). She is, in short, a
fascist dictatorship. This is
the beginning of wisdom about China.
China’s leaders are not pushing any universalist creed.
Fascism is never universalist.
It is introvert and parochial, a doctrine of autodidacts and
narrow, clouded minds. Hitler
never started out with any intention to Nazify Africa, or the Americas, or
Indonesia. He could not have cared less about those places, though I
dare say they turned up in his table talk from time to time.
His goal was to assert German control over what he believed to be
Germany’s rightful sphere of influence: Europe
and European Russia. Mussolini
talked, with what degree of real conviction I do not know, of restoring
the Roman Empire. (It is true
that he coveted a bit of Africa, too … but then, so did the Romans.)
Early 20th-century Japan was not bent on world conquest, only a
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere — precisely what China wishes to
construct in Central Asia and the West Pacific. One conversation-starter I
overheard roughly 1,000 times as a child, from older people in my
parents’ generation, was: “At
what point did you know that there was going to be a war?”
[Referring, of course, to WW2.
For British people of that age, WW2 was “the War”, and WW1 was
“the Great War”.] The commonest answer was:
“When Chamberlain came back from Munich,” i.e. in September
1938. Now, I think a lot of
people were kidding themselves here.
Chamberlain’s reception on
returning to London from the Munich conference was, in fact, ecstatic.
On the historical evidence, the British public believed him when he
said that he had achieved “peace with honour. I believe it is peace in
our time.” Skeptics —
notably, of course, Winston Churchill — were a minority.
It was only in the following weeks and months, as the nature of
Hitler’s ambitions became clearer, that the inevitability of war really
sank in. But to hear people
talk about this in the 1960s, everybody was a skeptic.
Said one of my uncles: “When
I saw Chamberlain waving that damn fool piece of paper [i.e. the agreement
with Hitler], I thought to myself: ‘You silly bugger’.” Thirty years from now my grandchildren may be listening to myself and some other old bores sitting on the porch in our rocking chairs asking each other: “When did you know that war with China was inevitable?” My answer will be: “When George W. Bush gave them that damn fool apology.” You silly bugger. |
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