Article by John Derbyshire |
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| Night
Thoughts The
Bottom Line.
The bottom line in the current geostrategic situation is the one
set out by blogger Noah
Millman and our own Stanley
Kurtz. In the
Cold War, we (not much at risk thanks to Mutual Assured Destruction
Doctrine) defended states like Germany, Turkey and South Korea (threatened
with invasion). In the Terror
War, we (highly at risk from smuggled WMD) depend on states like Germany,
Turkey and South Korea (not much at risk because nobody thinks they are
the Great Satan) to help us deal with Al Qaeda and that organization’s
potential suppliers.
Uncle
Sam: Say, do you mind if we
station troops and stuff on your soil? Nephew: What’s in it for us? U.S.: Well, (a) it will deter the
communists from overrunning you, and (b) if anything nasty does happen,
we’ll fight alongside you. Nephew: Okay, sounds good.
Hey, thanks!
Uncle
Sam: We need to use your soil as
a staging area for an attack on your neighbor — the one that’s busily
producing WMDs, which they will undoubtedly pass on, or sell, to Al Qaeda
and the like to use against us. Nephew: But if we do that, the
terrorists will target us, too. U.S.: Oh, don’t worry.
If we take out your neighbor, the terrorists won’t have any
really nasty stuff to use against you. Nephew: But if we flip you the bird,
they won’t bother us at all! Some
time after 9/11, George W. Bush was sitting in a room with his National
Security and Intelligence people, asking them:
“How much worse a thing might happen?
What might we have to deal with?”
They told him: “We
could lose a city.” Not
on my watch, thought (and quite possibly said) the President.
But
how do we prevent it? We hunt
down the terrorists as best we can. That,
however, is like killing roaches — there are always more, always more. So we put out of business those regimes that might supply the
terrorists with seriously unpleasant ordnance.
The “Axis of Evil” speech followed. But
how are we going to put, say, North Korea out of business, when none of
the neighboring countries will help us?
When, in fact, from motives of perfectly rational self-interest,
they are determined to do what they can to hinder us? The
logic all points one way: to
nuclear weapons. The only way
to put North Korea out of business without South Korea’s co-operation is
by attacking their emplacements along the DMZ with neutron bombs
(“enhanced radiation weapons”). Nothing
else does the job without precipitating an invasion of South Korea. We have to take out the Yong-byon reactor, too, and since
doing that would probably trigger the aforementioned invasion, and since
nuclear weapons are the only sure way to thwart that invasion, we may as
well go nuclear on Yong-byon too. If
we don’t do any of this, sooner or later we shall lose a city to a
smuggled nuke, which we would not likely be able to pin on any particular
country. Sure, North Korea
would be a prime suspect, but rogue Russian generals and Pakistani
scientists would be in the picture, too.
Either we break the nuclear taboo, or else someone breaks it over
our heads; and if the latter, we may very well have no meaningful response
to make. And
that’s just thinking about North Korea.
Then there is Iran. In
a way, Iran is an even more difficult situation.
Things could not possibly be worse than they are in, or with, North
Korea; and there is not the faintest sign of any improvement in that
wretched country. With Iran,
by contrast, there are lots of hopeful signs.
The people are fed up with Ayatollah rule, and trending towards a
rational system of governance. Even
so, should we let them get nukes? My
answer would be no. Even if
our taking action sets back all these hopeful signs?
Yes, even if. I
don’t believe, in fact, that at this point, we should let any more
nations get nukes. Not
desperate nations, not hopeful nations, not our best friends.
God knows, we have enough problems festering here. What’s
that you say? Iraq?
Oh, Iraq..... Get
out of the U.N.
Or at the very least, suspend our membership, withdraw our
ambassador, stop funding U.N. insitutions, and suspend all co-operation.
If all these nations that, for the maintenance of international
order, ought to be supporting us, will not do so, from reasons of national
self-interest — well, then, let us pursue our national
self-interest, without any further consultation with them.
Our national self-interest demands that we act swiftly to prevent
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist-friendly nations.
Good: let’s do it. It
is now clear, I think, that going to the U.N. over Iraq was a deadly
mistake, that will cost American lives.
We have all heard the rationales on offer — we had to do it to
keep Blair on board, etc., etc. — and it didn’t look as idiotic last
fall as it looks now. I’m
not going to fault the administration on this one, but I am going to say:
Enough! When
you have made a blunder like this, get out of it as swiftly and gracefully
as you can, and get back on the right course.
We don’t need Blair, we don’t need anybody.
We can take out Yong-byon, annihilate the North Korean armed
forces, and bring down Saddam Hussein, all inside a month.
Let’s do it. Let’s
roll. How
We Came to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.
A month after 9/11, I
posted a piece on this site with the title “Kinder, Gentler Warmaking.”
In it, I raised the genteel, monocled specter of Sir Kingsley Wood: In the fall of 1939, during
the early weeks of what in England was called “the phony war” (the
Germans called it sitzkrieg —
“the sitting-down war”), there was an illuminating exchange in the
House of Commons. Some
Members of Parliament were putting pressure on Sir Kingsley Wood, the head
of the Air Ministry, to bomb German munitions stores in the Black Forest.
Sir Kingsley was shocked. “Are
you aware it is private property?”
he protested. “Why,
you will be asking me to bomb Essen next!”
Essen was the home of the famous Krupp munitions factories. Four
year later, I observed, we were fire-bombing German cities, slaughtering
civilians like (to borrow a Chinese idiom) grass before the scythe.
That, I pointed out, is the coarsening effect of war.
I wondered when in the current War on Terror that effect would kick
in. There
are signs it already has. Rumsfeld
has deliberately not ruled out the use of nukes in Iraq.
The above-mentioned commentators, both very sober and thoughtful
types, have both mulled over the use of nukes in North Korea.
The inhibitions are crumbling.
If an American city goes up, those inhibitions will blow away like
chaff in the wind. It will be
1945 again, and the nuclear taboo will be in the trashcan of history,
along with Sir Kingsley Wood. A
few months ago, one of our writers here on NRO made a jokey aside
that included the phrase “nuke Mecca.”
This brought down on his head all the wrath of all the humorless po-faced
guardians of propriety. National
Review wants to nuke Mecca! Those
crazy conservatives! Now,
personally, I am very strongly opposed to nuking Mecca, and to the best of
my knowledge, all my colleagues here at NRO feel the same. (Though an alarming number of my e-mail correspondents have a
different opinion.) Yet a few
months ago, talk about nuking anyone was pretty much out of court.
Now sober analysts are discussing the merits of neutron bombs.
Even without any large-scale combat having taken place, you see the
moral slippage. This is war,
this is what happens. A
few weeks ago I was in the company of a distinguished American historian,
a man of deep learning with a shelf-full of books to his name.
It was around the time that the terrorists tried to shoot down an
Israeli airliner in East Africa. We
speculated on the possibility of terrorists here in the U.S. getting hold
of a shoulder-fired anti-aircraft rocket launcher, and bringing down a
civil airplane on U.S. soil. “If
that happens,” said my historian friend in all seriousness, “we’ll
be re-visiting Korematsu.” He
was referring to a 1944 ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the
Court upheld the right of the federal government to remove U.S. citizens
of Japanese descent from West Coast invasion zones for “the prevention
of espionage and sabotage.” Moral slippage. This
is war. Staring
at our sinewy thigh. The
attitude of the Europeans is not entirely a matter of rational
self-interest, mind. There
are other things going on, things to do with our military pre-eminence,
and their utter military hopelessness. Did you see that
piece in USA Today about the difficulties American
tourists are having in European countries?
“From Spanish plazas to Parisian metros, American tourists are
being quizzed, grilled and even spat on by people who do not approve of
the Bush administration's drive for a war against Saddam Hussein...”
I read it in my morning browse-around of the news the other day.
Then I moved on to something else, and the tourist thing drifted
gently down towards the sludge at the bottom of my mind. Before
it got there, though, I happened to read some other piece in which Ernest
Hemingway’s phrase “the sinews of war” cropped up. That triggered some process of word association.
The USA Today piece floated back to the surface (did you
ever get that feeling that an extended metaphor just isn’t working?),
bringing with it Yeats’s poem “On Those that hated The Playboy of
the Western World.” The
occasion of this poem was as follows.
The playwright, John Millington Synge, was a protégé of Yeats.
The poet had persuaded him to come back from Paris to help revivify
Irish theater. However,
Synge’s 1907 drama The Playboy of the Western World proved too
strong for the taste of bourgeois Dubliners, and got a bad reception.
Yeats wrote this poem in defense of his friend, and in mockery of
the play’s critics. Here is
the entire poem: Once,
when midnight smote the air, Eunuchs
ran through Hell and met On
every crowded street to stare Upon
great Juan riding by: Even
like these to rail and sweat Staring
upon his sinewy thigh. “Juan”
of course refers to Don Juan, the legendary lover, who could do to wild
excess what those eunuchs could not do at all.
Which brings us back to those railing, sweating Europeans. Closing
down China.
China’s communist dictators care about one thing only:
staying in power. To
stay in power, they have to keep the economy moving forward.
To do that, they have to maintain, and if possible increase, their
exports to the U.S. The
communist regime is entirely dependent on our willingness to buy Chinese
goods. If we embargoed
Chinese goods, many American firms would go out of business.
The prices of many things would rise, though other Third World
suppliers would soon fill the gaps. The
effect on China, however, would be a thousand times more dramatic.
Their economy would collapse. Memo to Hu Jintao: If the U.S. loses a city to some terrorist group, via a weapon that would not have been made if you had helped us shut down the Kim Jong-il regime, or via a weapon you sold, or helped someone develop — if that happens, pal, it will be around a hundred years before any American ever again buys any object stamped MADE IN CHINA. |
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